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Message in a Bottle: Illusive Remedies in the Parish 
Coastal Zone Lawsuits
“The coastal zone is affected by the coastal waters and the Seven 
Seas. Like love, the coastal zone is a many splendored thing. Its 
ecosystem is a splendid relationship between ocean and beach, 
between marshlands–and uplands, and between man and his 
environment.”1 – Senator Hollings, 1974
INTRODUCTION
The crystal blue waters of Malibu are transparent and magical. The 
boggy wetlands of Louisiana are murky and disappearing. Both California 
and Louisiana regulate activity along their coasts through a coastal zone 
management program, evidence of the confluence among all coastal 
states.2 At the outset, a federal initiative to incentivize state and local 
protection of the nation’s valuable coasts drove the creation of statewide 
coastal management programs. The marked differences between the 
implementation of respective programs resulted in a more accountable 
structure in California. In November 1991, the California Coastal 
Commission sued Amir Tahmassebi, a California landowner, alleging that 
he violated the California Coastal Act by failing to obtain a coastal
development permit required for certain activities on his Malibu property.3
The court held that the California Commission had the statutory authority 
to bring the suit, and Mr. Tahmassebi was estopped from re-litigating his 
claim that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over his property.4 In 
its ruling, the trial court required the Commission to comply with certain 
notice provisions prior to imposing penalties.5 The process in California 
was straightforward: the local commission demanded that the property 
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1. JOSH EAGLE & MEG CALDWELL, COASTAL LAW 362 (2011). 
2. The California Coastal Commission has focused its restorative efforts on the 
Malibu coastline for several years, and legislation in the state is ubiquitous. See Adam 
Nagourney, Battle over Lagoon Cleanup Divides a Surfing Haven, N. Y. TIMES, May 
25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/us/26malibu.html?mc ubz=3.
3. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Tahmassebi, 69 Cal. App. 4th 255, 257 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998). The California Commission brought suit under the Public Resources 
Code, which gave the Commission the right to bring the action for injunctive and 
declaratory relief as well as impose civil fines for violations of the permit 
requirements of the Coastal Act. The appellate court did not question the authority 
of the commission to bring the action. 
4. Id. at 259. 
5. Id. at 260. 
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owner take action, and when the landowner failed to comply, the 
Commission brought the dispute to the courts.6
Since 1980, Louisiana’s local parishes and designated state agencies 
have issued coastal use permits (“CUP”) to persons conducting activities 
throughout the coastal zone.7 There are many differences between Louisiana 
and California’s methods of regulating and implementing permit guidelines 
and imposing penalties for violations. Louisiana’s methods are exemplified 
in the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits. Substitute Mr. Tahmassebi’s land 
pursuits for Chevron Oil Company’s drilling and dredging within the 
Jefferson Parish Operational Area and exchange the California Coastal 
Commission for the Jefferson Parish local permitting authority. The 
Louisiana Coastal Zone Management Act, also known as the State and Local 
Coastal Resources Management Act (“SLCRMA”), similar to the California 
law, authorizes state and local authorities to seek injunctive and declaratory 
relief against violators of CUPs.8 In contrast to the Tahmassebi case, 
Louisiana, its local parishes, and the Department of Natural Resources have 
historically chosen not to bring suit against violators of the CUP process 
under SLCRMA.9 Without regulation to enforce violations, which may be 
followed by lawsuits, there is a gap in enforcement in Louisiana.10 The 
paradoxical reality is that Louisiana is likely the most in need of coastal zone 
enforcement.11
                                                                                                            
6. Id. 
7. William H. Forman, Jr., The Louisiana Coastal Resources Management
Act of 1978, 28 LA. B.J. 91 (1980). 
8. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D), (E) (2014). 
9. Local municipalities’ suits against oil companies are not limited to the 
area of environmental protection. Local municipalities have commonly brought 
suit over gun control issues. Several states have passed laws explicitly eliminating 
a cause of action for the local governments to bring suit against the gun industry. 
See Elizabeth T. Crouse, Arming the Gun Industry: A Critique of Proposed 
Legislation Shielding the Gun Industry from Liability, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1346, 
1357 (2004). See also Andrew S. Jessen, Louisiana and the Coastal Zone 
Management Act in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina: A Renewed Advocacy for a 
More Aggressive Use of the Consistency Provision to Protect and Restore Coastal 
Wetlands, 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 133, 151 (2006).
10. See infra, Part II.B.1. 
11. Southern Louisiana’s coastal zone is most prone to subsidence, which 
causes reduced sediment and sea level rise. See Michael D. Blum & Harry H. 
Roberts, The Mississippi Delta Region: Past, Present, and Future, 40 ANN. REV.
OF EARTH & PLANETARY SCIENCES 655, 668 (2012). Considering the contiguous 
United States, Louisiana comprises approximately 40% of the nation’s coastal 
marshlands. See William Lindsey, Louisiana’s Coastal Zone, It’s All Special, But 
Some Areas Deserve Legal Classification: Using Section 214.29 of Louisiana’s
SLCRMA to Designate Special Areas and Protect the Coastal Zone, 27 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 351, 352 (2014). A study concerning coastal wetlands loss in 
Louisiana may be found at https://perma.cc/5GHP-VTJM.
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In 2013, Jefferson Parish filed suit against nine oil companies.12 The 
Parish alleged that the oil companies had violated the conditions of their 
CUPs and that the companies had failed to obtain additional CUPs when 
required.13 Five other parishes also sued,14 but Jefferson Parish’s suit was 
the first to be decided. In August 2016, the 24th Judicial District Court 
dismissed Parish of Jefferson v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., et al. based on a 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but in November, the same
judge reversed his decision, allowing the suit to proceed.15 Although 
SLCRMA explicitly grants the right for state and local governments to 
enforce violations of the CUP program, the statute’s language is unclear 
as to what point in the regulatory process such action should occur.16
Inevitably, the question still arises whether the state or local government 
must turn to other administrative remedies listed in SLCRMA prior to 
seeking a judicial remedy.17 Following Judge Enrisht’s reversal, the 
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied defendants’ application for 
supervisory review.18 The supervisory writ defendants sought is currently 
pending in the Louisiana Supreme Court.19 The lack of guidance in the 
statute, exacerbated by the lack of litigation on the issue, dooms courts to 
continually dismiss suits that result in real harm to Louisiana’s coast.20 The 
goal of the Parish Coastal Zone (“Coastal Zone”) lawsuits is to hold the 
defendant oil companies responsible for violations of the state and local 
                                                                                                            
12. See Dawn Geske, Jefferson Parish Suits Against Gulf Oil, Gas Industries 
Dismiss after Parish Fails to Correctly Review Permits, LOUISIANA RECORD,
Aug. 14, 2016, https://perma.cc/C998-CMBL.
13. Reasons for Judgment, Parish of Jefferson v. Atlantic Richfield Co. et al., 
No. 732-768 (La. Dist. Ct. 2016) [hereinafter Atlantic Richfield].
14. The parishes are Vermillion, Plaquemines, Cameron, St. Bernard, and 
Lafourche. See also Update: Vermillion Parish Police Jury Vote Not to Support 
Oil and Gas Lawsuit, KATC (Aug. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/8CUP-XB2P. 
15. Laura Springer Brown & Kelly Becker, First Parish Coastal Zone 
Lawsuit to Proceed to Decision Falls for Failure to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies, THE ENERGY LAW BLOG (Aug. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/5R9Y-
AHQ9; Mark Schleifstein, Jefferson Lawsuit against 9 Oil Firms to go to Trial,
NOLA, Nov. 10, 2016, https://perma.cc/CP5A-VM8R [hereinafter Schleifstein, 
Jefferson Lawsuit]. 
16. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36 (2014). 
17. See Schleifstein, Jefferson Lawsuit, supra note 15. 
18. LAURA S. BROWN & JENNIFER FERRATT, COASTAL EROSION LITIGATION 
IN LOUISIANA 12 (2017), https://perma.cc/9CTD-CAZE.
19. Id.
20. In Jefferson Parish v. Atlantic Richfield et al., the Jefferson Parish district 
court dismissed the case, granting the defendant’s exception for prematurity for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court listed some of the 
administrative remedies that were available to the plaintiff but did not specify, other 
than by referring to the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisprudential 
doctrine, why the remedies must come first. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic 
Richfield, No. 732-768.
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coastal zone management (“CZM”) laws.21 In light of that purpose, the 
plaintiffs in the Coastal Zone lawsuit requested damages from the 
defendants, without taking those administrative steps that align with the 
structure of SLCRMA and its goal of protecting the coast.22 The statute 
and the administrative regulations should be strengthened in order to reflect 
a more concise order: first identifying the harm, taking steps to stop it, and 
then seeking a judicial remedy either through injunctions or penalties.23
This comment focuses in on the issues with SLCRMA and the 
administrative regulations and the holes that they leave open–whether the 
state and local parishes are required to take administrative steps prior to 
filing suit and whether the parishes’ claims constitute actual harm based 
on the definition of continuing and non-continuing uses. Part I will delve 
into the federal and state Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) and 
describe the grounds upon which the current Coastal Zone lawsuits stand. 
Part II examines the definitions of continuing and non-conforming uses 
under the statute and whether those non-conforming uses constitute 
enforceable harm. Part III will analyze whether, based on that harm, the 
state and local parish governments were required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Part IV will provide revisions 
of SLCRMA (La. R.S. 49:214.36) to mirror the nuances of zoning law and 
other successful state coastal programs, which will lead to efficient and 
streamlined enforcement of violations of CUPs. In the midst of Louisiana’s
murky waters, the overarching purpose of this comment is to determine 
whether the Jefferson Parish and the other local governments’ cases are 
worthy of judicial determination and will survive appeal.
I. STATE LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
SLCRMA is grounded in both Louisiana’s legislative history and a 
strong federal initiative. Unique in the national realm, the federal Coastal 
Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) allowed for a significant amount of 
state control over individual programs. The first step in passing the 
Louisiana law was federal approval.24 Once passed, implementation could 
                                                                                                            
21. See Plaintiff’s Petition for Damages, Parish of Jefferson v. Canlan Oil Co. 
et. al, No. 732-771, at 14 (La. Dist. Ct. 2013) [hereinafter Canlan Oil]. 
22. Id. Further, the parish, in its petition, references the stated policy of the 
coastal resource program which is to prevent adverse impacts to the coastal zone. 
Plaintiff’s Petition for Damages, Canlan Oil, No. 732-771, at 12. 
23. In Terrebonne Parish School Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., the Supreme 
Court of Louisiana noted that the case presented a balancing between the need for 
coastal restoration and the importance of adherence to the law as well as respect 
for the contracting parties. 893 So. 2d 789, 791-92 (La. 2005). 
24. EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1.
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begin on a statewide level. The nuances of the permitting process, as well 
as the enforcement provisions, are important features of the legislation that
play a significant role in the Coastal Zone Lawsuits.25 SLCRMA’s history, 
its hallmark features, and its overarching role in the lawsuits bring forth 
questions of the necessity of administrative involvement prior to bringing 
suit over a CUP violation. Part A of Section I explores the steps Louisiana 
took to get federal approval of its coastal management program, Part B 
examines implementation of the program at the state and federal levels, 
and Part C explains the recent developments with the parish coastal zone 
lawsuits.
A. Seeking Federal Approval 
Louisiana’s coastal management program began with the federal 
initiative to regulate activities that occur within the coastal zones of all 
states. The purpose of the federal CZMA was to increase protection of the 
Nation’s coasts.26 CZMA established several programs that award grants, 
which a coastal state would be able to utilize if they participated and 
submitted program proposals.27 Prior to CZMA, several states were 
already heading in the direction of organized CZM programs.28 From the 
federal perspective, there are few requirements that all states must meet, and 
the federal law gives the state significant discretion in forming and 
implementing the program once it is approved.29 Specific language in 
CZMA directs that there must be a continued consideration of the national 
interest during the program’s implementation.30 Although states must 
consider what is in their best interest, the focus must remain on the national 
perspective. 
                                                                                                            
25. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan 
Oil, No. 732-771. 
26. At the time, Congress considered the decline in the nation’s coastal resources 
and diminishing water quality a serious problem. Jessen, supra note 9, at 133. 
27. U.S. DEP’T OF COM. & LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT (1980) [hereinafter FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
STATEMENT] (Letter from David Treen to Secretary Philip Klutznick). 
28. See EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 369. As of today, thirty-four 
states have created their own statewide coastal programs. Lindsey, supra note 11, 
at 359.
29. See EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 361. 
30. See FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 27, at 118. The 
national interest consists of virtually everything that the local and state coastal 
management programs are supposed to protect, including facilities primarily used 
for energy production and transmission as well as wetlands and endangered 
species. Supra p. 120.
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CZMA requires states to submit a plan for development of a CZM 
program, in order for the states to participate.31 The Secretaries of 
Commerce and National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration must 
jointly approve the program.32 Once approved, funds become available to 
the state.33 Upon implementation of a state’s plan, the state may use the 
consistency provision, which gives it some veto authority over federal 
activities in the coastal zone.34 Due to the variation among state programs, 
some CZM laws are more effective and active than others. All state CZM 
programs must establish a sufficient mechanism for communication and 
coordination between the management agency and local governments, as
well as other state agencies.35 The consistency provision requires that 
coastal activities carried out or approved by the federal government 
affecting the state’s coastal zone must comply with the state’s coastal laws 
and policies.36 The requirements of intrastate efficiency, as well as 
consistency between federal and state governments, should have resulted 
in a nationwide map of coastal programs, which holds coastal users from 
South Carolina to Hawaii accountable. 
Like other states, Louisiana understood the importance of its coastal 
zone prior to passage of the federal law. Even before the implementation of 
Louisiana’s CZM program, the legislature had recognized the importance of 
agencies in conservation and development of the coastal zone.37 Louisiana
enacted SLCRMA primarily in pursuit of federal grant awards, and 
SLCRMA mirrored the federal law.38
                                                                                                            




35. See EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 367. 
36. Linda Krop, Defending State’s Rights Under the Coastal Zone Management
Act–State of California v. Norton, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 54, 55 (2007). 
37. As early as 1971, the Louisiana legislature included in its Acts legislative 
support for the Louisiana Advisory Commission on Coastal and Marine 
Resources. One of the purposes of the commission was to assist the governor in 
the development of the Louisiana Coastal Zone Management Plan and to do so, 
the commission was authorized to work directly with state agencies and other state 
departments. See H.B. 118, 1971 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1971). 
38. “Primary source of federal wetlands regulations is Section 404 of the 
Federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 42 USC sect. 1344. Under CWA sec. 404 (a), 
42 USC sec. 1344(a), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has primary authority 
for issuance of fill and dredge permits.” See SCOTT A. BICKFORD & WILLIAM F.
RIDLON II, Key Issues in Wetlands Regulation in Louisiana, in OVERVIEW OF 
WETLANDS REGULATION 7 (1994). Act 361’s definition of the coastal zone 
paralleled the definition in the federal CZMA guidelines. The Act defines the 
coastal zone as “all islands, beaches, salt marshes, wetlands and areas necessary 
to control uses which have a direct and significant impact on coastal waters.” See
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 27. 
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Independent of state regulation, the Army Corps of Engineers also has 
the power to issue 404 permits, which are different than CUP permits, for 
those activities that affect wetlands and navigable waters.39 The Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”) delegates authority to issue 404 permits to the Corps, 
but ultimately, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) retains final 
authority.40 Statutory law and the Administrative Code provisions provide 
that certain activities do not require permits under the 404 scheme.41 Prior 
to its implementation, the coastal use permitting process in Louisiana 
relied heavily on the existing 404 permitting process, creating overlap 
between the state and federal programs.
The path to approval for SLCRMA was rough. Initially, federal 
authorities completely rejected Act 705, the Louisiana legislature’s first 
proposal for the statewide program.42 Early legislative debate surrounding 
the final version of the Act focused on defining the Louisiana coastal zone 
and determining the relative roles of the state and local governments in 
implementing the program–an issue that continues to plague the wetlands 
today.43 After amendments and federal approval, on July 10, 1978, 
Governor Edwin Edwards signed Act 361, and SLCRMA became law.44
The statute established the Coastal Commission, which is composed of 
twenty-three members, eleven of which represent the parishes in the coastal 
zone. The governor appoints the remaining members of the Commission 
from interest groups and the Department of Natural Wildlife and Fisheries.45
The Coastal Commission’s purpose is to serve as an appeals body for issues 
                                                                                                            
39. See Julie D. Livaudais, Conflicting Interests in Southern Louisiana’s
Wetlands: Private Developers Versus Conservationists, and the State and Federal 
Regulatory Roles, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1006, 1012-13 (1982). In contrast to OCM 
management, the Corps of Engineers is continuously monitored, particularly by 
citizen groups, for abidance to the 404 permitting. A citizen suit provision exists 
within the act where individuals and environmental groups may participate in 
permit decisions and challenge permit decisions. See supra pp. 1014-15. 
40. Margaret Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What Wetlands are Regulated? 
Juridiction of the §404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10372, 10373 (2010). 
41. For example, LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(B)(7)(a) (2017), which 
governs agricultural, forestry, and aquacultural activities, exempts activities that 
do not require a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer and meet the 
federal requirements for such activities. 
42. The State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978,
LOUISIANA COASTAL LAW 1978, at 1, https://perma.cc /YY4Z-PW5L [hereinafter 
LA. COASTAL LAW]. Part of the reason for the rejection was the definition of the 
boundary that was included in the coastal zone. 
43. U.S. DEP’T OF COM. & LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, LOUISIANA 
COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM–FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 2-
3 (1980) [hereinafter LA. ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT].
44. See LA. COASTAL LAW, supra note 42.
45. Id. at 2. 
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concerning CUPs.46 However, the Coastal Commission has not been widely 
utilized as an appellate body within coastal zone regulation.47 SLCRMA 
created a new administrative body for Louisiana, rooted in the Coastal 
Commission, but the Commission does not play as significant a role as 
anticipated by the original Act.
B. Implementation of the State and Local Coastal Resources 
Management Act
In creating the CZM authority, Louisiana had to determine which
agency and governing body would head the task of issuing permits and 
regulating those users that received permits. The result was a mutual state 
and local initiative through which local parishes can issue permits for 
activities that occur within their designated operational area. In the Parish 
Coastal Zone lawsuits, both the state and local parishes have asserted their 
interests, illustrating the tension in the statute. In focusing on implementation, 
SLCRMA narrows in on uses of state and local concern. 
1. Regulating Uses of State Concern
SLCRMA’s objectives are illustrated through broad statements of 
public policy.48 SLCRMA lists twelve goals to be achieved through the 
Coastal Use Guidelines,49 one of which is to create a separate management 
authority at the state level for regulating coastal uses.50 Originally, primary 
administration of the Act was under the authority of the Department of 
Transportation and Development, but SLCRMA specified that the governor 
could order that administrative functions be transferred to the Department 
of Natural Resources (“DNR”) or the Department of Natural Wildlife and 
Fisheries.51 This transfer of authority created the Office of Coastal 
Management (“OCM”), which is currently the administrative body at the 
state level responsible for issuing CUPs.52
                                                                                                            
46. Id. 
47. See WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 13:14 (2013). 
See also LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I § 723 (2017). 
48. See LA. COASTAL LAW, supra note 42, at 2.
49. Act 361 lays these goals out in Section 213.8. LA. ENVIRONMENTAL 
STATEMENT, supra note 43, at 44-45.
50. See FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 27, at 3. 
51. See LA. COASTAL LAW, supra note 42, at 2.
52. Id. See also Applying for a Coastal Use Permit, LA. DEP’T OF NAT.
RESOURCES, https://perma.cc/5FCQ-6WRK (last visited Aug. 28, 2017) 
[hereinafter Applying for a CUP]. 
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SLCRMA regulates activities as uses in the coastal zone and 
determines whether those uses are of state or local concern.53 The 
determination of whether an activity is of state or local concern remains 
with the local governments but must be in accordance with certain 
criteria.54 The definition of “use” under SLCRMA is any activity that has 
a direct and significant impact on coastal waters.55 In determining which 
uses are prohibited, the legislature intended to target the most common 
alterations of wetlands.56 Any person is able to submit a request to DNR 
for a formal determination as to whether a proposed activity will require a 
permit.57 Further, OCM, during its review of coastal use permits, works 
with the permit applicant to minimize the impact to coastal habitats or to 
ensure that they are avoided.58 In order to receive a permit, a prospective 
permittee first submits an application to either OCM or a local government 
with an approved program.59 Once received, OCM must give public notice 
of the permit application and distribute copies to the local government in 
whose jurisdiction the use is going to occur.60 Within thirty days of the 
issuance of public notice or within fifteen days after a public hearing, the 
permitting body must decide whether to approve or deny the permit. Once 
decided, the applicant, or any other aggrieved party, such as the local 
government or an affected local, state, or federal agency, has thirty days 
to appeal the decision to the Coastal Commission.61 The procedure for 
application and issuance of coastal use permits at the state and local level 
is clear, eliminating the possibility that the oil companies are not aware of 
the guidelines and pointing to a gap in enforcement.
                                                                                                            
53. In a recent compilation of wetlands litigation on the Coastal Zone 
Management Act in Louisiana, the reporter lists some cases that concern SLCRMA. 
See also WANT, supra note 47.
54. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(F)(1)(a) (2017).
55. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.23(13) (2000) defines use as “any use or activity 
within the coastal zone which has a direct and significant impact on coastal 
waters.”
56. These listed activities include draining, dredging, and filling of wetlands, 
modification of the hydrologic regime, highway construction, mining and mineral 
extraction, as well as water pollution. See BICKFORD & RIDLON II, supra note 38, 
at 5. 
57. See WANT, supra note 47.
58. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, A COASTAL USER’S GUIDE TO THE 
LOUISIANA COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM II-3 (2015).
59. See LA. COASTAL LAW, supra note 42, at 4. 
60. Id.
61. Id. at 5. 
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2. Regulating Uses of Local Concern
Local governments may adopt their own coastal management 
programs, which are responsible for issuing permits. Today, Louisiana’s
coastal zone encompasses twenty parishes.62 Ten Louisiana parishes have 
implemented approved coastal management programs.63 If the activity is 
within the parish’s sphere of authority, then the parish program’s approval 
is sufficient, and the state does not have to approve the permit.64
A local government with an approved program may issue a CUP for 
uses of local concern conducted within its coastal zone.65 In general, areas 
of local concern are more isolated than those of state concern.66 A
prospective permittee may submit an application for uses that are of local 
concern within an area with an approved local program, and the local 
permitting body has the right to make the initial determination of whether 
or not the permit should be granted.67 Uses of local concern include dredge 
and fill projects that do not intersect more than one body of water, thus, 
remaining local in scope.68 The Administrative Code lays out guidelines 
for determining when a use is either one of state or local concern.69 Further, 
the Code gives deference to local uses. When there is an overlapping use, 
raising proportionate state and local concerns, then the use should be 
                                                                                                            
62. In 2012, the Louisiana legislature passed House Bill 656 (Act 588) which 
modified the boundaries of the coastal zone. The zone still includes twenty coastal 
zone parishes. See Coastal Zone Boundary, DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES,
https://perma.cc/M5RC-XL7M (last visited Aug. 28, 2017). 
63. Those parishes include: Cameron, Calcasieu, Jefferson, Orleans, 
Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. James, St. Tammy, and Terrebonne. See
WANT, supra note 47.
64. Local Government Participation in the Coastal Zone Management 
Program, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, https://perma.cc/9DAP-LBDL (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2017). 
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.30(A)(1) (2010); see also Parish of 
Plaquemines v. Total Petrochemical & Refining USA, Inc. et al, 64 F. Supp. 3d 
872, 878 (E.D. La. 2014).
66. See Jessen, supra note 9, at 141.
67. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.30(C)(1) (2010). 
68. See Livaudais, supra note 39, at 1033. 
69. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723 (2017). Besides those uses that are 
classified as state or local in SLCRMA, the permitting agency must consider the 
following factors in determining the classification of a use: the relationship of the 
proposed use to a particular use classified in the Act, and if there is an overlap 
between that of state and local concern, then there should be a deference to a local 
concern unless the act is carried out with state funds, involves the use of or has 
significant impacts on state or federal lands, is mineral or energy development, 
affects Louisiana’s offshore jurisdiction, will have major effects on water flow, 
or has significant interparish or interstate impacts. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, 
§ 723(F)(3) (2017).
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classified as a use of local concern.70 DNR may review and reverse a 
decision of a local coastal program.71
C. A Trilogy Continued: Third Lawsuit by a Public Entity Against Oil 
Companies
The series of suits filed by the coastal parishes against the oil companies 
follows suits non-private individuals have brought in recent years against oil 
companies for activities conducted in the coastal zone.72 These suits have 
not reached resolution, and Louisiana citizens are still looking for guidance 
on how, and if, oil companies will be held responsible for damage to the 
coastal zone.73 The Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits are unique because the
plaintiffs cited SLCRMA as the cause of action for the oil companies’
violations.74 Due to the multiplicity of filings in the Parish Coastal Zone 
Lawsuits, this comment will focus on Jefferson Parish’s petitions, in order 
to highlight the parish’s claims and to focus on the inquiry of whether 
Jefferson Parish’s suit is worthy of judicial determination. 
In Jefferson Parish’s complaint for the Barataria region, the Parish 
alleged that the oil companies had violated SLCRMA and, thereby, caused 
damage to land and water bodies located in the Coastal Zone.75 Specifically, 
the petition alleged that the oil companies had drilled for oil in violation of 
CZM laws and that they had carried out activities without the required 
CUP.76 Those activities included use of waste pits, discharge or disposal 
                                                                                                            
70. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723 (2017). 
71. Id.
72. In recent years, the board of commissioners for the Southeast Louisiana 
Flood Protection Authority-East filed suit against one hundred oil, gas, and 
pipeline companies. See Taylor Boudreaux, Legislatively Capping an Energy 
Lawsuit: Problems Posed by Stripping a Pending Suit Against Ninety-Seven Oil 
and Gas Companies, 76 LA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2016); see also Bob Marshall, 
Levee Board Argues in Federal Court for Revival of Landmark Lawsuit, THE 
LENS (Feb. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/Z6CT-X4DY. Terrebonne Parish School 
Board filed suit against oil companies for activities conducted in the wetlands 
pursuant to a mineral lease. See Ryan M. Seidemann, Louisiana Wetlands and 
Water Law: Recent Jurisprudence and Post Katrina and Rita Imperatives, 51 LOY.
L. REV. 861, 866 (2005); see also Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 893 So. 2d 789.
73. See Mark Schleifstein, Jefferson, Plaquemines Parishes File Wetland 
Damage Lawsuits against Dozens of Oil, Gas and Pipeline Companies, NOLA, 
Apr. 27, 2017, https://perma.cc/D7WH-Z38V. Bobby Jindal, as well as the 
Louisiana legislature, fought vehemently against that suit, eventually instituting 
Act 544 into law. The thrust behind Act 544 was that the levee board was the 
improper body to file the lawsuit. See Boudreaux, supra note 72, at 962. 
74. Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan Oil,
No. 732-771, at 2-3.
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
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of oil field waste, and exceeding the permitted uses of the issued coastal 
use permits.77 In answering one of Jefferson Parish’s petitions, the 
defendant oil companies raised three dilatory exceptions: vagueness and/or 
ambiguity, improper cumulation and improper joinder, and prematurity for 
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.78 On August 1, 2016, the 24th 
Judicial District Court issued judgment on the defendants’ third exception 
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, finding that the lawsuit was 
premature, and proceeded to dismiss the case without prejudice.79 Since then, 
the state, under the guidance of Governor John Bel Edwards, has declared that 
it will intervene in the lawsuit.80 The future timeline of the Parish Coastal 
Zone Lawsuits depends on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision on 
whether to grant a writ of certiorari to the oil companies. A determination by 
the Supreme Court should clarify the meaning of continuing and non-
continuing uses and whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is a 
necessary step.
II. CONTINUING AND NON-CONTINUING USES AS HARMS
For those uses that are permitted in the coastal zone, there is a difference 
between continuing and non-continuing uses. Especially for coastal 
management, those uses that began lawfully prior to the implementation of 
the CUP process may be exempt from abiding by regulations within 
SLCRMA. This is the concept of “grandfathered” uses that are not treated 
uniformly throughout the coastal management law.81 If the oil companies’
violations occurred one-time, prior to the implementation of the CUP process, 
then they may not be held accountable. Further, issues of prescription arise 
where activities are no longer ongoing and are no longer contributing to 
harm. This issue weaves into the broader problem of a lack of guidance in 
the statute for whether uses that are non-conforming must be regulated 
according to certain administrative steps. 
                                                                                                            
77. Id. at 8-12. 
78. State of Louisiana’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s
Exceptions to the State of Louisiana’s Petition for Intervention, Atlantic Richfield,
No. 732-768. 
79. Id. 
80. Jeff Adelson, Governor Edwards Instructs Administration to Intervene in 
Parish Coastal Suits Against Oil and Gas Companies, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 11, 
2016, https://perma.cc/RL66-ZNH6. 
81. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014). 
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A. Conforming Through Acquiescence: Substituting a Non-Conforming 
Use 
Although CZM laws provide strict guidelines for what may or may not 
occur within the coastal zone, there is a possibility that a use that is not in 
accordance with the guidelines may become accepted either through a 
statutory exception or governmental acquiescence. For those users that have 
obtained a coastal use permit, the user must abide by the terms and 
conditions of that permit.82 As an exception, the Administrative Code, in its 
general provisions, defines in-lieu permits, meaning activities which usually 
require a CUP do not require one.83 The second exception is a grandfathered 
use: a user lawfully commenced the activities prior to the implementation 
of the CUP process and does not require a CUP.84 This provision creates a 
category of uses, which may have been prohibited after the CUP process 
was in effect and yet did not require CUPs. Based on these exceptions, a 
coastal user must seek review through administrative processes prior to 
commencing any coastal activity to either determine whether that activity 
is lawful under the provisions or whether the use would be subject to 
regulation by another division. Because of the overarching national 
interest, the federal government must certify that the proposed activity will 
be conducted in a manner that is consistent with SLCRMA.85 Either of 
these designations would require administrative action to ensure that the 
uses are conforming within the exceptions. By implicitly requiring an 
administrative step, the law as it applies to conforming and non-conforming 
uses hints that certain steps must be taken prior to seeking judicial remedy. 
There is a gap in the requirements for the uses that fall under a 
statutory exception but continued to occur through the beginning of the 
implementation of the CUP process. SLCRMA and the Administrative 
Code do not provide a definition for those activities that existed prior to 
the implementation of the CUP process and continued to occur.86 Read in 
tandem with SLCRMA, the Administrative Code distinguishes between 
                                                                                                            
82. Id.
83. “Coastal use permits shall not be required for the location, drilling, 
exploration and production of oil, gas, sulpher and other minerals subject to 
regulation by the Office of Conservation of the Department of Natural Resources 
as of January 1, 1979.” LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(A)(3) (2017).
84. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(B)(8)(a) (2017).
85. In a CUP issued to Florida Exploration Co. in the Jefferson Parish 
operational area, the permittee also submitted an application to the Army Corps 
of Engineers, certifying that the proposed activity was within the guidelines of the 
Louisiana Coastal Management program. See LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES,
Coastal Use Permit 821271 (issued Oct. 15, 1982).
86. These permits are often referenced to as in-lieu or “grandfathered”
permits although that specific language does not exist in the statute.
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continuing and non-continuing uses for coastal use permit purposes.87
Continuing uses are uninterrupted, whereas non-continuing uses are 
conducted on a one-time basis.88 In order for a person’s activities to be a 
prohibited use, as one that required a permit, it must be first identified as 
such. 
Jefferson Parish’s original petition included a comprehensive list of all 
CUPs that had been issued within the parish’s Operational Area since the 
inception of SLCRMA.89 Some of the flagged permits originated fifty to 
sixty years ago.90 One of the violating permittees, Chevron Oil Company, 
applied for a CUP to dredge certain canals in 1983, five years after the 
implementation of SLCRMA and three years following implementation of 
the permitting process. By 1984, the follow-up investigation for Chevron’s
permit indicated that the project had been terminated and that the permittee 
had met all of the permit conditions.91 The investigating body was still 
concerned about some aspects of the application.92 The coastal resource 
analyst assigned to the project requested a field investigation of Chevron’s
site, prompted by Chevron’s potential for disruptive work in the canal 
system.93 Despite the company’s proposed use or activity, local authorities 
still signed off on the project as terminating successfully.94 Chevron’s
activities are a non-continuing use since the activity was conducted and 
completed on a one-time basis. However, there must be a rationale for why 
Chevron’s permit was included in Jefferson Parish’s petition. The petition 
                                                                                                            
87. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723 (2017). Both continuing and 
noncontinuing uses are permitted uses under the Administrative Code. 
88. “Continuing uses are activities which by nature are carried out on an 
uninterrupted basis, examples include shell dredging and surface mining 
activities, projects involving maintenance dredging of existing waterways, and 
maintenance and repair of existing levees;” “Noncontinuing uses are activities 
which by nature are done on a one-time basis, examples include dredging access 
canals for oil and gas well drilling, implementing an approved land use alteration 
plan, and constructing new port or marina facilities.” LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 
I, § 723(C)(9)(c)(i)-(ii) (2017).
89. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan 
Oil, No. 732-771, at 9. 
90. Geske, supra note 12.
91. See LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, Coastal Use Permit 19831461 (issued 
Sept. 3, 2009).
92. The investigation cited occurred on August 7, 1984. The investigation 
report listed Steven Chustz as the Coastal Resource Analyst and Rocky Hinds as 
the investigator on Chevron’s project. See id. Most permits issued after 1978 may 
be found in the Department of Natural Resources database. 
93. See Coastal Use Permit 821271, supra note 85. 
94. See Coastal Use Permit 19831461, supra note 91. Most permits issued 
after 1978 may be found in the Department of Natural Resources database. 
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does not isolate the specific permits that were allegedly in violation of the 
coastal management laws. 95
The categorization of “use” under SLCRMA does not contain a definition 
of a “new use,” yet Jefferson Parish included this term in its petition.96 The 
petition addresses the existence of a waste pit, alleging that the pit was 
caused by the actions of the defendant oil companies but conceding that 
the companies’ actions may have begun prior to the passage of SLCRMA. 
The petition further claims that the continued existence of the waste pit 
constituted a “new use” for which the user must get another permit.97
Jefferson Parish’s characterization of the continued existence as a “new use”
is misleading. Under the coastal management laws, there is no process by 
which an existing use can transform into a new use. By the Parish alleging 
the new use in such a way, the permitting body can shy away from any 
responsibility for monitoring the activities of coastal users. 
B. Potential for Prescription of Claims 
Regardless of the determination of whether a “harm” has occurred, a 
person who is claiming harm must bring that claim within a certain period 
of time. Under SLCRMA, claims of CUP violations do not have a clear 
prescriptive period.98 If the plaintiffs in the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits 
are seeking damages, instead of restorative efforts or injunctions, then the 
rule of prescription should be even more narrowly construed. Due to the 
lack of case law on SLCRMA, there is no guidance on the issue of when 
prescription and the duty to abide by governmental regulations collide. 
The prescriptive period for violations of the duty to restore may also 
provide a blueprint for longstanding CUP claims.
1. Nonconforming Grandfathered Claims
Nonconforming uses that were grandfathered in, as if they were 
permitted, may still cause harm to the coastal zone and would be a potential 
source of damages for a plaintiff. In its petition, Jefferson Parish contends 
                                                                                                            
95. See generally Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone,
Canlan Oil, No. 732-771, at 9.
96. Id.
97. Id. 
98. Prescription is a civil law term that designates a period of time after which 
a substantive right is extinguished. The common law equivalent is statute of 
limitations. See Wm. Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals: 
Rethinking How Choice-Of-Law Regimes Approach Statute of Limitations, 65 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 526 n.189 (2015). Because this comment primarily 
focuses on Louisiana law, prescription will be used instead of the common law 
term. However, the terms are practically synonymous. 
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that, even if the defendants’ activities occurred prior to the implementation 
of the CUP process, the company’s activities were unlawful under 
different statewide orders.99 These statewide orders govern permits for 
drilling of oil wells and the existence of pits.100 However, when a party is 
conducting uses in the coastal zone in an unlawful manner, the issue of 
prescription of those claims arises. 
Prescription is interrupted when the cause of action is not known nor 
reasonably knowable by the plaintiff.101 In considering the granting of a 
contra non valentem exception, the court will deem the plaintiff to know 
the information he could find out through reasonable diligence.102 In 
Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp, a case concerning dredging of canals which 
was based in a breach of contract for a mineral lease, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court found that the claims for damage caused to a landowner’s
property were subject to a one-year prescriptive period.103 Although 
Jefferson Parish’s claims, along with the other parishes in the Coastal Zone 
Lawsuits, are based in a statutory violation, the parishes are alleging that 
the defendants have caused damage to the coastal zone by failing to adhere 
to the coastal use guidelines and the conditions within their coastal use 
permit.104 Jefferson Parish’s specific request for relief in damages supports 
an underlying tort theory. For example, the plaintiff alleges that the 
defendants violated SLCRMA through the construction and use of unlined 
earthen waste pits.105 This is a prohibited use under the statute, but the 
plaintiff’s petition does not allege when the waste pit came into existence, 
merely stating that no matter the date, its existence would be considered 
illegal.106 Without an applicable prescriptive period of claims for violation 
of CUPS, the harm must be ongoing, and it is unclear that the plaintiffs 
have alleged the continuing harm sufficiently in their complaint.
                                                                                                            
99. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan 
Oil, No. 732-771, at 14. The petition states that the activities were illegal under 
Statewide Orders 29, 29-A, and 29-B, as well as various field wide orders and 
orders of the Louisiana Stream Commission. 
100. See id. (Statewide Order 29-B). 
101. Id. This is known as the doctrine of contra non valentem, a discovery rule, 
which should only be applied in extreme circumstances. 
102. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 246 (La. 2010). The 
contra non valentem doctrine is unique to Louisiana. The doctrine is juridically 
created and prevents the running of prescription against those who are not able to 
bring suit. See HON. MAX TOBIAS ET AL., LOUISIANA CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
§ 6:98 (2016-2017 ed.).
103. See Marin, 48 So. 3d at 244. 
104. Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan Oil,
No. 732-771, at 2-3.
105. Id. at 9. 
106. Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan Oil,
No. 732-771, at 2-3.
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2. Prescription of Legal Non-Conforming Uses
In the cases involving legal non-conforming uses, the harm for which 
a plaintiff is suing is non-abidance by coastal use permitting laws. The 
only guidance in the statute is that once a coastal use permit has been
issued, the user has two years to initiate a CUP.107 Further, the user has five 
years from that issuance to complete the use.108 In general, interpretation of 
prescriptive statutes should be construed in favor of maintaining the party’s
claim.109
In the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits, the plaintiffs’ allegations in their 
petitions are that the defendants failed to comply with state regulations, 
but the defendants’ failure to comply is inevitably intertwined with harm 
caused to the coastal zone.110 Damages are not a requirement for a valid 
cause of action, yet all the parishes that are plaintiffs alleged them.111 For
those permits that were granted by OCM or a local permitting body, when 
the user did not abide by the conditions of the permit, La. R.S. 49:214.36 
does not specify a prescriptive period for a permitting body to bring an 
action against a violator of that CUP.112 The prescriptive period for tort 
claims may be relevant for violations of CUPs. For tort claims, the 
prescriptive period commences on the day that the tortfeasor causes the 
harm and runs for one year.113 In Chevron’s CUP file, under special permit 
conditions, the application provides that the permit expires within two 
years of the Secretary’s signature.114 At some point, the government’s
claim is stale, unless they are able to prove that the activity has continued 
to cause harm each day since the expiration of the permit.
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: A NECESSARY STEP?
The 24th Judicial District Court in the Jefferson Parish case, in its 
original adjudication, did not confront the question of whether the plaintiff 
was required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing suit 
                                                                                                            
107. LA. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 43, pt I, § 723(C)(9)(d) (2017).
108. Id.
109. See Marin, 48 So. 3d at 245. 
110. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan 
Oil, No. 732-771, at 14. “Defendants have failed to comply with numerous 
provisions of the state coastal zone management program, as previously alleged, 
and thus they are liable under the CZM Laws for any damages resulting from 
these violations.”
111. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan 
Oil, No. 732-771, at 14. 
112. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36 (2014).
113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (2017).
114. See Coastal Use Permit 19831461, supra note 91.
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against the oil companies.115 Because the defendants filed an exception for 
prematurity, the court did not have to decide whether there was a 
requirement of exhaustion based on the merits of the suit.116 The district 
court initially granted the exception.117 Exhaustion of administrative 
remedies is a standing doctrine of administrative law, and a defendant may 
plead in an exception for prematurity that the suit is not ready for judicial 
determination because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his or her 
administrative remedies.118 In order for the defendant to be successful, 
under Louisiana law, he or she must first show the availability of the 
administrative remedy, and then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show 
that the proper steps have been taken or that the remedy is inadequate.119
A. Space Occupied by the Doctrine
In Jefferson Parish v. Atlantic Richfield et. al., the defendants plead a 
dilatory exception of prematurity for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. The effect of La. R.S. 49:214.36 is two-prong. The statute 
creates a right and a cause of action for state and local governments to seek 
judicial enforcement of violations of Louisiana CZM laws and sets out 
enforcement steps for an administrative agency to take against violators of 
the act.120 The exception of prematurity for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies claims that a judicial cause of action has not come into existence 
because the plaintiff has not met a prerequisite condition before asserting 
the claim.121 In its original disposition of the Jefferson Parish suit, the 24th 
                                                                                                            
115. In its original reasons for judgment, the court in the 24th JDC found that 
the local parish had not exhausted its administrative remedies against the oil 
companies. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768. The 
reversal of the original opinion also does not answer the question of whether 
exhaustion of administrative remedies was necessary prior to filing suit. 
116. See Defendant’s Exceptions for Prematurity, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
117. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768. In November, 
the 24th JDC reversed its original decision. See Schleifstein, Jefferson Lawsuit,
supra note 15. 
118. See FRANK L. MARAIST, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 6:6, n.27 (2d ed. 2008). 
119. Id.
120. Parish of Plaquemines, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 890-91; See Boudreaux, supra 
note 72, at 985-86.
121. Floyd v. East Bank Consol. Fire Protection Dist. for Parish of Jefferson, 
40 So. 3d 160, 163 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 926(A)(1) 
(2010); Steeg v. Lawyers Tit. Ins. Corp., 329 So. 2d 719, 720 (La. 1976)). The 
dilatory exception differs from a peremptory exception. The purpose of a 
peremptory exception is to declare that the plaintiff’s action is legally nonexistent 
or effectively barred by law. The peremptory exception tends to dismiss or defeat 
the action. See Oakville Community v. Plaquemines Parish, 942 So. 2d 1152, 
1155 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 923 (2006)). 
2017] COMMENT 255
Judicial District Court found that the Parish had not satisfied its burden of 
proving that it was entitled to judicial relief under La. R.S. 49:21.36, because 
it failed to show that “any administrative remedy [was] irreparably 
inadequate,” and thus, required judicial enforcement.122 Although the district 
court later reversed that decision, the court’s adjudication was not based on 
availability of administrative remedies.123 If the court were to face the merits 
of that issue, its central focus would be, first, if it is proper to address the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine and, second, whether there 
is a prioritization of remedies under the statute so that the plaintiffs must 
seek some remedies before others.
1. The Dilatory Exception for Prematurity 
In the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits, the defendant’s pleading of the 
dilatory exception for prematurity is relevant to an inquiry of whether the 
parishes’ suits are properly before the court. The judge must determine 
whether the case is ready for adjudication. The exception is a tool for 
parties to highlight the inadequacy of the suit for failure to take certain 
administrative steps.124
The analysis begins with determining whether the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies can and should be applied to the 
coastal use permitting process. In general, when courts are faced with an 
issue involving an administrative agency, the court considers whether the 
agency’s action was final and whether the person bringing suit has 
exhausted his or her administrative remedies.125 In Louisiana, a defendant 
pleading the dilatory exception of prematurity may do so in cases where the 
pertinent law provides a procedure for the claimant to seek administrative 
relief before seeking judicial review.126 In Steeg v. Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation, competing insurance companies fought over the issue of 
                                                                                                            
122. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768. In its opinion, the 
district court cited the requirement of consistency between state and local 
divisions, the requirement for a field surveillance program, and the authority of 
the permitting body to issue cease and desist orders as well as suspend, revoke, or 
modify, coastal use permits.
123. Instead, the court reversed and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a new 
trial. See BROWN & FERATT, supra note 18.
124. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Dilatory Exception of 
Prematurity for Non-Compliance with La. Rev. Stat. § 42:263, Atlantic Richfield,
No. 732-768. In their memorandum, the defendants argued that the lawsuit should 
be dismissed because the parish failed to obtain the Attorney General’s approval 
as required by LA. REV. STAT. § 42:263.
125. See WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 261 (3d ed. 2009). 
126. See CATHERINE PALO, LOUISIANA SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RELATED 
TERMINATION MOTIONS § 2:97 (2016 ed.).
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prematurity for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.127 Similar to 
the initial Jefferson Parish decision, the trial court found that the plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit.128
The Supreme Court in Steeg found that the burden shifts to the plaintiff 
to show that all administrative remedies are irreparably inadequate. This 
circumstance is exceptional.129 An administrative remedy is irreparably 
inadequate when the harmful activity causes irreparable injury.130 The 
Supreme Court in Steeg declined to adopt this argument and reserved the 
right to determine administrative disputes for the administrative bodies 
with original jurisdiction over such disputes.131 Yet, the Steeg case came 
before the Supreme Court prior to the statewide implementation of the 
CUP process. According to the Steeg Court’s reasoning, it was clear that 
the legislature intended for administrative remedies to be exhausted in the 
area of insurance law.132 Regulation through permitting is similar in that 
there is a clear sense of public policy that supports the need for legislation.133
This notion of public policy translates to a strong administrative presence 
for both OCM and the local permitting bodies.134 SLCRMA emphasizes 
that the regulatory and administrative procedure should be the guiding 
light, not judicial enforcement.135
2. Finding a Right of Action 
By granting a right of action through La. R.S. 49:214.36 to certain 
persons aggrieved by violations, the legislature made those who conduct 
activity in the coastal zone susceptible to suit. Simply because the statutory 
language grants the right does not necessarily mean that the cause of action 
                                                                                                            
127. Steeg, 329 So.2d at 720.
128. Id. 
129. Id. (citing O’Meara v. Union Oil Co., 33 So. 2d 506, 510 (La. 1947)). In 
the 24th Judicial District Court’s opinion, the court found that the plaintiff’s
assertion that the administrative remedy was inadequate because it did not provide 
for an award of civil damages and not persuasive. The concern of whether issue 
of damages may be addressed prior to administrative remedies is discussed infra.
130. Id. at 721 (“[J]udicial proceedings may sometimes be used when irreparable 
injury might otherwise result.”).
131. Id. at 722. 
132. Id.
133. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.22(2)(b) (2006). “The legislature declares that 
it is the public policy of the state: . . . To express certain regulatory and non-
regulatory policies for the coastal zone management program. Regulatory policies 
are to form a basis for administrative decisions to approve or disapprove activities 
only to the extent that such policies are contained in the statutes of this state or 
regulations duly adopted and promulgated pursuant thereto.”
134. See Applying for a CUP, supra note 52.
135. Id. 
2017] COMMENT 257
is always in existence. Determining at what point that right of action comes 
into existence, triggering a cause of action, is vital in understanding 
whether the suits will achieve any success. 
A reading of the plain language of La. R.S. 49:214.36(D) leads to the 
conclusion that state and local governments in Louisiana have a right of 
action against persons who do not abide by CUP regulations.136 The statute 
states: 
The secretary, the attorney general, an appropriate district attorney, 
or a local government with an approved program may bring such 
injunctive, declaratory, or other actions as are necessary to ensure 
that no uses are made of the coastal zone for which a coastal use 
permit has not been issued when required or which are not in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of a coastal use permit.137
The Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and the Attorney 
General are authorized to bring injunctive relief for both violations of a 
coastal use permit and failure to obtain a coastal use permit when
needed.138 In addition, the Secretary of DNR and each parish with an 
approved local program have the authority to conduct field surveillance, 
issue cease and desist orders, and suspend, revoke, or modify permits.139
In La. R.S. 49:214.36, the provision authorizing suspension, revocation,
or modification of CUPs precedes the provision authorizing judicial 
enforcement.140 The statute limits the judicial enforcement remedy to state 
officers and local governments while excluding other entities or private 
individuals. However, La. R.S. 49:214.36 expands the availability of an 
action through breach of contract or in pursuit of other administrative 
remedies.141 The court in the Jefferson Parish case concluded that it is the 
                                                                                                            
136. In a decision over whether the federal district court had diversity 
jurisdiction in Plaquemines Parish v. Total Petrochemical case, Judge Zainey 
remanded to the state district court but, in dicta, suggested that the statute could be 
reasonably interpreted as authorizing the Parish to file suit to enforce the Coastal 
Zone Management laws in Louisiana. 64 F. Supp. 3d at 890. See also Boudreaux, 
supra note 72, at 991. 
137. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014) (emphasis added).
138. Id. 
139. See also Boudreaux, supra note 72, at 985. 
140. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36 (C), (D) (2014), respectively. 
141. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(O)(4) (2014) states, 
Nothing in this Section shall prevent or preclude any person or 
any state or local governmental entity from enforcing 
contractual rights or from pursuing any administrative remedy 
otherwise authorized by law arising from or related to a state or 
federal permit issued in the coastal area pursuant to R.S. 
49:214.21 et seq., 33 U.S.C. §1344 or 33 U.S.C. §408.
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burden of the plaintiff to show that irreparable injury would result, and 
thus administrative remedies are not sufficient.142 It is possible for the law 
on exhaustion of administrative remedies to be laid out more clearly.143
B. Availability of Remedies
If the district courts are confronted with the issue of availability of 
administrative remedies for state and local governments, the first source 
to consider is enabling legislation, followed by the Administrative Code. 
Administrative agencies, such as DNR, may only operate based on the 
powers they have been delegated through statute.144
1. Suspending Action
La. R.S. 214.36(C) enables the permitting body to suspend a permit 
for a permittee.145 The Administrative Code specifies the procedure for 
suspending a permit.146 A permitting body may suspend a permit if one of 
three requirements is satisfied: the permittee has failed to comply with the 
terms and conditions or modifications of the permit; the permittee has 
submitted false or incomplete information with the permit; or the permittee 
has failed or refused to comply with a lawful order or request on behalf of 
the permitting body.147 The Jefferson Parish petition did not specify 
whether these actions were taken in response to the alleged violating 
activities. Rather, the plaintiffs’ main contention is that, even if remedies 
exist, all remedies are irreparably inadequate.148
La. R.S. 49:214.36 does not specify whether the uses for which a state 
or local entity is allowed to bring suit must be either a state or local use. 
Under the language of La. R.S. 49:214.36, it is unclear whether the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies equally to state 
and local permitting bodies.149 If the doctrine does not apply equally, then 
                                                                                                            
142. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
143. For example, see McAlister v. County of Monterey, 147 Cal. App. 4th 
253, 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“Under the doctrine of administrative exhaustion, 
the long-standing general rule is this: ‘where an adequate administrative remedy 
is provided by statute, resort to that forum is a ‘jurisdictional’ prerequisite to 
judicial consideration of the claim.’”).
144. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
COMMENTS 33 (11th ed. 2011).
145. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(C) (2014).
146. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(2) (2017).
147. Id.
148. See Parish of Jefferson’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s
Exception of No Right of Action, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
149. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014) states, 
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the parishes may not have to prove that administrative remedies are 
required to be exhausted prior to bringing suit.150 Read in tandem with the 
rest of the statute, the distinction of state and local uses should not operate 
to prevent state or local governments from bringing a cause of action.151
2. Considering Prior Violations 
In Louisiana, courts have held government agencies responsible for 
failing to enforce applicable laws and regulations. In Oakville Community 
v. Plaquemines Parish, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court’s decision, which granted the defendant’s exception of no cause 
of action.152 Plaquemines Parish Council, as the local permitting body for 
CUPs, had granted a permit to Industrial Pipe, Inc.153 The Oakville 
Community Group sued the Council based on allegations that the Council 
had failed to comply with the regulatory requirements under the Louisiana 
Administrative Code.154 Specifically, the group claimed that the Council 
did not comply with the statutory requirements for the approval of a CUP 
for the proposed landfill expansion.155 By holding that the Oakville group 
had a right of action, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that the action by the 
group should stay within the court system.156
The Oakville case illustrates the lack of consideration that prior 
violations are given to new proposed activities. In 1985, the Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) issued an order assessing 
a penalty against the sole proprietor of Industrial Pipe, Inc. for operating 
an illegal solid waste dump.157 After issuing the order, DEQ managed the 
                                                                                                            
The secretary, the attorney general, an appropriate district 
attorney, or a local government with an approved program may 
bring such injunctive, declaratory, or other actions as are 
necessary to ensure that no uses are made of the coastal zone for 
which a coastal use permit has not been issued when required or 
which are not in accordance with the terms and conditions of a 
coastal use permit. (emphasis added).
150. See Parish of Plaquemines, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 892. 
151. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.25(B) (2014) states, “[T]he delineation of uses 
of state or local concern shall not be construed to prevent the state or local 
governments from otherwise regulating or issuing permits for either class of use 
pursuant to another law.”
152. See Oakville Community, 942 So. 2d at 1157. 
153. Id. at 1154.
154. Id. 
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1158. 
157. Corinne Van Dalen, Oakville–Unprotected: A Study in Environmental 
Injustice, 58 LOY. L. REV. 391, n.2 (2012).
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proceedings.158 DEQ was involved because the original use by Industrial 
Pipe was a land use. Therefore, the company was required to seek a CUP 
because they sought to expand their activities into the wetlands.159 In 2003, 
Industrial Pipe was able to obtain a CUP without significant consideration 
of the permittee’s prior violation of land use laws.160 If those oil companies 
who are held liable in the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits have committed 
past violations on land or in water, and the government then approved the 
permit, then the permitting body should also be held responsible for not 
properly regulating the permittee’s use when there is evidence of not 
following guidelines. 
SLCRMA mandates that “no use” may be conducted without proper 
permitting.161 Jefferson Parish’s claims are largely based on uses of state 
concern.162 Judicial interpretation has indicated that the language in the 
statute is not express in authorizing joint parish and state action in civil 
litigation. The issue is inconsequential because the parishes are authorized 
to bring suit on behalf of the state.163 However, the parishes do not have 
jurisdiction over state uses pertaining to administrative remedies and may 
only issue cease and desist orders as it relates to a local use.164 If this is the 
only administrative remedy available to local permitting bodies when 
regulating state uses, then the local government may have no other option 
besides bringing suit against the defendant oil company. There are 
conflicting directions within the statute: the parishes are allowed to bring 
suit on behalf of the state but are not allowed to take the administrative 
steps when it comes to the same allegations of harm.
The Administrative Code provides further rules that coastal users must 
read alongside the Coastal Zone regulations. A permitting body may seek 
civil and criminal relief if the permittee does not comply with a cease and 
desist order or a suspension.165 One reading of this provision suggests that 
                                                                                                            
158. Id. LDEQ set up a plan with Industrial Pipe, authorizing it to continue the 
activities to an extent and subsequently issued compliance orders after finding 
further violations. 
159. Id. at 393. 
160. Id. at 394. 
161. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014).
162. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan 
Oil, No. 732-771.
163. See Parish of Plaquemines, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 892. “Section 49:214.36(D) 
does lack the more express ‘state’ language found in the statutes at issue in 
Louisiana v. Union Oil and Williams, supra, much less an explicit authorization 
for a parish to join the State of Louisiana as an active party-plaintiff in civil 
litigation.”
164. Id. “Section 49:214.36(B) expressly limits a local government’s authority 
to issue cease and desist order to permits pertaining to local uses.”
165. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(4) states, “If the permittee fails 
to comply with a cease and desist order or the suspension or revocation of a 
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the permitting body must first issue a cease and desist order or take steps 
to suspend or revoke a coastal use permit prior to filing suit and seeking a 
judicial remedy. Judge Zainey, in Parish of Plaquemines v. Total 
Petrochemical, read the provision expansively, applying a broad lens to 
the Act–the regulatory provision did not limit the local governments to 
taking certain steps before others.166 However, this is not the interpretation 
that was followed by the 24th Judicial District Court in the Jefferson 
Parish case, where the court found that, despite the multitude of 
administrative remedies available to the permitting body, it was the local 
government’s burden to prove that judicial action was necessary.167
Instead, the provision should be read narrowly in connection with La. R.S. 
49:214.36(B) to only issue cease and desist orders for local uses.168 If this 
is the case, then cease and desist orders were not an available remedy to 
Jefferson Parish or any of the other parishes. According to La. R.S. 
49:214.36, a penalty or cost may not be assessed against a violator without 
the opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing.169 In other areas of coastal use 
permitting law, when a permittee does not abide by the procedural 
guidelines of a coastal use permit, the permit is vacated.170 However, this 
does not cover circumstances where there was no permit issued in the first 
place.
3. Modifying Priorities 
According to the 24th Judicial District Court, one of the available 
alternatives to the permitting body is to allow modification of coastal use 
permits.171 Prior to issuing a cease and desist order, or suspending or revoking 
a permit, the permittee is allowed to modify the permit.172 However, the 
process of modification is one that the permittee must initiate, and the 
permittee must agree to the modifications with the permitting body, which 
may either be the state’s Department of Natural Resources or the approved 
                                                                                                            
permit, the permitting body shall seek appropriate civil and criminal relief as 
provided by §214.34 of the SLCRMA.”
166. See Parish of Plaquemines, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 892. (“[T]he Parish’s
damage claims are not limited to permitted uses to which §723(D)(4) of the 
Administrative Code pertains.”).
167. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
168. Id.
169. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(L) (2014).
170. See Industrial Pipe, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Council, 139 So. 3d 1168, 
1169 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 
171. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
172. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(1)(a) (2017).
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local permitting program.173 Thus, the issuance of a modified permit 
hinges on the mutual agreement of the two parties: the permitting authority 
and the permittee. To determine whether a modification of a permit, based 
on a changing use, or an application for a new permit is required, the DNR
must determine whether the proposed activity will significantly increase 
the impacts of a permitted activity.174 In Pardue v. Gomez, the First Circuit 
considered whether the plaintiff was required to apply for a new coastal 
use permit or could modify his existing permit.175 The First Circuit 
departed from the plain meaning of the Administrative Code’s regulations, 
finding that if the permitting body determined that the proposed activity 
would cause significant impacts, the only requirement was sending the 
permittee’s application for a modified permit out for public notice.176
Interpreting the modification provisions in light of their placement in 
the regulations, allowing permittees to modify their permits after the fact,
is not an available remedy to, nor a remedy readily enforced by, the 
permitting bodies that observe non-compliant behavior.177 Further, even if 
the permitting body was allowed to initiate modifications, a determination 
is required that the use will “significantly increase” the impacts of a 
permitted activity.178 This is the same standard that must be applied to 
determine if a use should be permitted.179 The criteria that must be met in 
order to determine whether the use requires a permit are best addressed by 
an administrative body familiar with the impact and background of the 
area, rather than a judicial body designated to rule on matters of law. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court, in Pardue v. Gomez, found that this is a 
consideration that requires analysis of social and economic, as well as 
                                                                                                            
173. See LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(1)(b) (2017); see also LA.
ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(C)(1) (2017), which discusses general 
requirements for permit applications. 
174. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, §723(D)(1)(a) (2017). 
175. Pardue v. Gomez, 597 So. 2d 567 (La. Ct. App. 1992). The plaintiff 
wanted to build a boat launch, which was not covered by his prior permit. In the 
communications with DNR, Pardue could not “properly proceed by way of an 
application for a modification of an existing permit.” Supra p. 569. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 571. “After careful consideration of the record adduced in the case 
at bar, this Court hereby finds that the Department did, in fact, act arbitrarily and 
capriciously in denying the modification requested.” Supra p. 570. 
178. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, §723(D)(1)(a) (2017). 
179. LA. ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 43, at 48. The statement 
cites three criteria that must be considered. These are that, “significant public 
benefits will result from the use,” “the use would serve important regional, state 
or national interests, including the national interest in resources and the siting of 
the facilities in the coastal zone identified in the coastal resources program,” or 
“the use is coastal water dependent.”
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environmental impacts.180 If the use will cause such a change, then the 
permitting body is directed to process the permit as a new application for 
a permit, rather than a modification.181 Those companies which failed to 
obtain a permit when one was required will not be able to argue that 
modification was available to the administrative bodies, since it must be 
first sought by the permittee. 
It is unclear whether the “permitting body” referred to in the 
Administrative Code includes both state and local permitting bodies, since 
they are given such authority under La. R.S. 49:214.36,182 or whether it 
only refers to state governments. The 24th Judicial District Court found 
that the “permitting body” language referred to the DNR because the 
Secretary of the DNR is the only authority authorized under the Code to 
determine whether a coastal use permit is required.183 Depending on which 
body is responsible for the issuing the permit, either the state or local 
agency, in a claim brought under La. R.S. 49:214.36(D), the necessary 
administrative will vary. 
The lack of a distinction in La. R.S. 49:214.21-36 between state and 
local permitting authorities creates confusion over which body has 
primary authority in enforcement and is an anomaly in other coastal states 
which have coastal zone management programs.184 As a comparison,
California’s Coastal Act, creates a space for local governments to regulate 
activities within their jurisdictions through their own proposed local 
coastal plan or one that the Coastal Commission prepares.185 Once the local 
plan is in place, the Coastal Act delegates the authority to the local 
government to issue coastal development permits.186 Further, Washington’s
Shoreline Management Program mandates that local governments must 
adopt shoreline master programs (“SMP”) overseen and reviewed by the 
Department of Ecology.187 This Program was used by the local counties, 
particularly in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King County.188 The County brought 
suit for declaratory judgment, injunction, damages, and other relief because 
                                                                                                            
180. See 597 So.2d at 572. 
181. Id. 
182. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014). 
183. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
184. See EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 369 (“Local governments… 
are often primary implementers of state coastal policies and programs.”).
185. WANT, supra note 47, at § 13:5 (referencing Act. Cal. Pub. Res. Code 
§30500, “Each local government lying, in whole or in part, within the coastal zone 
shall prepare a coastal program for that portion of the coastal zone within its 
jurisdiction. . . . [A]ny local government may request, in writing, the commission 
to prepare a local coastal program, or a portion thereof, for the local government.”). 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at § 13:35. 
188. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King County, 91 Wash. 2d 721 (Wash. 1979). 
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the developer had not applied for a substantial development permit prior to 
commencing construction.189 The Court found that the local county 
governments in Washington have the authority to enforce the regulations 
under the Shoreline Management Act (“SMA”).190 The SMA makes explicit 
that local county governments may not bring injunctive, declaratory, or 
other actions for enforcement, unless they attempt to engage the DNR in the 
process first.191 This requirement that the local parishes first turn to the state’s
Department of Natural Resources before seeking judicial enforcement of 
violations of coastal use permits is not in La. R.S. 49:214.36.
C. Accessibility of Damages 
The administrative process plays an important role in the assessment of 
civil damages.192 This notion implies that the civil damages are triggered by 
the administrative process, in that the process is what determines the amount 
and breadth of damages. Without an adequate assessment of damages by the 
respective administrative agencies, the penalty may be solely in the court’s
discretion. 
The language in La. R.S. 49:214.36 is unclear on the appropriate steps 
for administrative remedies, but the availability of damages within the statute 
might provide some guidance. The 2014 revision of La. R.S. 49:214.36(O) 
states that damages received from enforcement of a violation of a CUP must 
be directed towards coastal protection, restoration, and the overall 
improvement of the coastal area.193 This model is not representative of what
                                                                                                            
189. Id. at 724.
190. Id. at 732.
191. See REV. CODE OF WASHINGTON ANN. § 76.09.140(3) (2017):
Injunctions, declaratory actions, or other actions for enforcement 
under this subsection may not be commenced unless the 
department fails to take appropriate action after ten days written 
notice to the department by the county of a violation of the forest 
practices rule or final orders of the department or appeals board.
192. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
193. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(O) (2014):
Any monies received by a state or local governmental entity 
arising from or related to a state or federal permit issued pursuant 
to R.S. 49:214.21 . . . a violation thereof, or enforcement thereof, 
or for damages or other relief arising from or related to any of 
the foregoing, or for damages or other relief arising from or 
related to any use as defined by R.S. 49:214.23(13) shall be 
used for integrated coastal protection, including coastal 
restoration, hurricane protection, and improving the resiliency 
of the coastal area.
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is common in “public law litigation,”194 from the last century into the 
present, where there has been a disconnect between the right that is 
asserted by the plaintiff and the remedies that are afforded.195 By requiring 
that the damages that are received from a lawsuit under La. R.S. 49:214.36 
must flow to areas of coastal protection, SLCRMA unifies the right of 
action that is being asserted by state governments with the purpose behind 
the law. Thus, if the available remedy that is given goes towards coastal 
restoration, then the enforcement mechanisms should be clear so that the 
remedies can properly be allocated.
The revised version of subsection (O) lists a multitude of sources that 
could activate the “monies” or the damages provision.196 The money 
damages may arise from a violation or enforcement.197 Damages may also 
arise for any other damages or relief arising from “the foregoing.”198 The 
language in the revision is extremely broad and gives ample room to the 
courts for interpretation. The 24th Judicial District Court interpreted the 
provision exclusively, finding that without involvement in the administrative 
process, the amount of damages cannot be determined.199 This suggests a 
judicial reluctance to get involved in determinations of damages by 
administrative bodies. Considering this judicial reluctance and the multiplicity 
of administrative remedies, it is clear that permitting bodies should turn to 
those remedies prior to turning to the courts. 
IV. ZONING THE COAST AND STREAMLINING A SOLUTION
For those lawsuits that are currently pending, a change in the language 
of the statute will not have a retroactive effect. A proposal for an end to 
the unequal application must occur within the legal framework that already 
                                                                                                            
194. Public law litigation consists of lawsuits which fight for significant social 
values that affect most of society. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, n.1 (1989).
195. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1293-94 (1976) provides:
The form of relief does not flow ineluctably from the liability 
determination, but is fashioned ad hoc. In the process, moreover, 
right and remedy have been to some extent transmuted. The 
liability determination is not simply a pronouncement of the legal 
consequences of past events, but to some extent a prediction of 
what is likely to be in the future. And relief is not a terminal, 
compensatory transfer, but an effort to devise a program to 
contain future consequences in a way that accommodates the 
range of interests involved.
196. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.46(O) (2014).
197. Id. 
198. Id.
199. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
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exists while addressing the ongoing concerns through the lawsuit. This will
include making other remedies more readily available to the permitting 
bodies and state and local agencies. The purpose of the CZMA was never to 
induce tort-like lawsuits, but to encourage care and regulation of the coast. 
Any solution for how the CZMA should be implemented should be guided 
by that principle.
A. Allowing for Judicial Discretion
The local parishes’ claims that the oil companies have violated 
SLCRMA and the Administrative Code are not currently enforceable due 
to the availability of other administrative remedies.200 Louisiana’s statute 
is not clear concerning which actions must come first: must parishes first 
suspend, revoke, or modify a permit, or can they take civil action before 
instituting any of those actions?201 This issue is intensified in most states, 
not just Louisiana, because courts are unwilling to impute knowledge of a 
violation or a duty onto the state and local permitting agencies to check 
for compliance with issued permits.202 However, some states are more 
effective at dealing with this problem through statutory clarity. For 
example, North Carolina’s coastal law ties administrative remedies and 
judicial enforcement into one provision and allows for judicial discretion 
in determining the remedies afforded to the plaintiff.203 According to 
North Carolina’s statute, both the State agency and local government’s
rights of action are triggered upon a violation of the provisions of the 
coastal management law, and the statute clarifies that the government may 
institute the action before or after a proceeding for the collection of a 
penalty has been instituted.204 Thus, when a person has failed to comply 
with the requirements under the North Carolina law, he or she may file an 
action seeking relief.205
                                                                                                            
200. See supra, Part I.C.
201. See discussion supra, Part III.B.
202. In Feduniak v. California Coastal Commission, the California court found 
that there was no statutory duty on behalf of the Coastal Commission to review 
decisions by local permitting agencies nor were they willing to impute knowledge 
to the Commission of the status of all properties for which permits were issued. 
148 Cal. App. 4th 1346, 1365-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). The California courts have 
found that neither a statutory duty nor an administrative duty exists to check for 
compliance. Supra p. 1363. 
203. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 113A-126(a)-(b). 
204. Id.
205. In the case of State ex. rel. Rhodes v. Gaskill, the State filed a complaint 
and motion for preliminary injunction in order to restrain the defendant from 
violating the Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 and the Dredge and Fill Act 
and to require restoration of the property. Although the court eventually dismissed 
the case, it was due to the fact that the parties had reached a consent judgment 
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The available remedies to state and local permitting bodies are 
suspension, revocation, and modification of a permit.206 By incorporating 
a duty into the Administrative Code for OCM to supervise the permitting 
decisions emitted by local permitting bodies, there would be a dual 
responsibility both on behalf of the state to enforce its permitting 
regulations, through cease and desist orders, or by filing notice of potential 
suspension, prior to filing suit. Likewise, permittees would be encouraged 
to stay updated on their permit conditions, particularly as to whether or not 
they are meeting the established conditions of their permits. In the 
Terrebonne Parish School Board case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that there was no implied duty on the behalf of a lessor to restore the land 
when the agreement did not expressly provide for such a provision.207
However, the CUPs expressly provide for the conditions that a user must 
abide by in order to be in compliance.208 By enforcing these provisions, 
OCM and the local permitting bodies will hold the coastal users more 
accountable prior to turning to judicial remedies. 
Enforcement remedies in the Administrative Code should be expanded 
to account for specific steps taken by local permitting bodies in order to 
provide additional guidance to administrative bodies. The Administrative 
Code is limited to one enforcement provision.209 By increasing such 
provisions, there will be a clear procedure for a state or local government to 
follow. This will lead to greater accountability for the permittee and provide 
proof to the courts that the permitting body has exhausted all administrative 
remedies prior to seeking a judicial remedy. Other states have attempted to 
achieve this transparency and have often succeeded. For example, the 
California Code of Regulations requires a methodology for identifying 
issues that must be implemented by the local coastal programs that exist in 
the state.210 The purpose of the methodology required under the California 
Code is to identify existing or potential conflicts in the Coastal Zone.211
From the local program’s inception, there is a designated purpose and 
incentive towards achieving the overarching public policy of the state. In 
analyzing that provision, the Appellate Court in California noted in Yost 
v. Thomas that the role of the state and local governing bodies is to carry 
out the administrative functions that are meant to achieve the public policy 
                                                                                                            
during the pending period which rendered the issue before the court moot. 383 
S.E.2d 923 (N.C. 1989). 
206. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(C) (2014). 
207. Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 893 So. 2d at 802. 
208. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(C)(9) (2017).
209. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(4) (2017).
210. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 13503 (2017).
211. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 13503(a) (2017). 
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of the state.212 By designating the power to enact enforcement provisions 
to the respective local permitting bodies, those administrative agencies are 
able to control their permitting processes while remaining within the 
framework of the Coastal Management Act’s overarching objectives and 
policies. 
B. Streamlining the Cause of Action
To align the stated goals and remedies of SLCRMA, the power to file 
suit for violations should be reserved to the designated government
official, while allowing for the opportunity to funnel the benefits of 
enforcement down to the local level. The California Code of Regulations 
exclusively allows the executive director of the Coastal Commission to 
bring a direct action against a violator under its enforcement provisions 
for the California Coastal Act.213 Louisiana should streamline its 
authorization to bring suit, specifically against violators of the coastal use 
permits, into the office of the secretary of DNR. Public and private persons 
and the state and local governments should still be able to bring suit based 
on breach of contract provisions, and other administrative remedies should 
remain available. The body of law surrounding coastal regulation is 
complex, and the authority to bring suit for violations of coastal use permits 
should be delegated to one office. The secretary of DNR is emphatically 
involved in the permitting process and must ensure consistency between the 
purpose of the state’s coastal management program and implementation.214
The Coastal Commission has jurisdiction over appeals of coastal use permit 
decisions, followed by the Attorney General.215 The Coastal Commission 
should implement this priority of enforcement by becoming the body to 
first hear all issues concerning violations of coastal use permits. 
Similarly, California has put in place a mechanism for appeal from the 
local governments to the Coastal Commission based on certain provisions.216
An appeals court in California faced this issue in North Pacifica, LLC. v. 
                                                                                                            
212. See Yost v. Thomas, 189 Cal. Rptr. 549, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
213. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 13173 (2017):
Whenever the executive director of the commission determines 
that any violation of the provisions of the California Coastal Act 
of 1976 has occurred or is threatened, the Attorney General may 
file an action in the name of the commission for equitable relief 
to enjoin such violation, or for civil penalties, or both, or may 
take other appropriate action pursuant to Chapter 9 of the 
California Coastal Act of 1976.
214. See Boudreaux, supra note 72, at 985.
215. For an example, see Letter from Attorney General William J. Guste to 
Brenda McClure (Feb. 21, 1980) (on file with author). 
216. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30603 (West 2017). 
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California Coastal Commission, where the local city government refused to 
seek review, through appeal, by the state’s coastal commission, claiming that 
it was not required under the statute.217 Because the appeals court had 
previously held that the plaintiff needed to exhaust its administrative 
hearings, it held similarly in this case that the administrative process, 
through the Coastal Commission, should be prioritized before judicial 
review.218
Fields of zoning regulation and coastal use permitting regulation are 
subject to parallel frameworks of analysis.219 Zoning laws operate under 
similar mechanisms and rationale as coastal management laws.220 The 
Louisiana zoning laws explicitly designate that local authorities may bring 
an action when a building or structure is in violation of the laws, but those 
authorities may also turn to other remedies.221 The Supreme Court of 
Louisiana upheld that local authority to file suit in City of New Orleans v. 
Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District.222 The purpose of 
zoning laws is to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare 
of the community.223 Similarly, in the case of coastal use law, the doctrine 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be applied in the zoning 
context.224 By officially incorporating zoning’s application into the coastal 
use context, these issues may be solved.
In contrast to the coastal permitting regulations, changes, which 
significantly increase the impacts of a permitted activity, under zoning 
regulations, are processed as a new application, rather than a modification.225
Altering the Administrative Code to process all new uses with significant 
impact on the coastal zone will force the permitting body to objectively 
                                                                                                            
217. See North Pacifica, LLC. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 2008 WL 741314 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
218. Id. at 5. 
219. See Van Dalen, supra note 157, at 392-94. 
220. The transition between land use regulation and coastal management 
regulation was demonstrated in the case of Oakville Community v. Plaquemines 
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222. See City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Commissioners of Orleans Levee Dist, 
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analyze the permittee’s past record. This will be more efficient than 
requiring an agreement between the parties.226 Additionally, this would 
eliminate the confusion about whether a new use will have such an impact 
that it would require a new application. Instead, the Office of Coastal 
Management will process all new activities as a new application. Further, 
zoning regulation enforcements are subject to a five-year prescription.227
C. Incorporating the Deference Doctrine 
An administrative agency’s interpretation of whether a use is 
permissible and additionally, whether a defendant violated those uses 
should be the foremost consideration in a decision involving regulatory 
structures.228 Louisiana courts have not adopted this deference doctrine 
explicitly in the limited number of rulings on coastal use permits. Yet, 
based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the 
Supreme Court in Steeg found that deference should be given to 
administrative bodies when looking at regulations.229 The Supreme Court 
has also echoed that it is unwilling to submerge itself in the restoration of 
the coast, primarily through damages from litigation disputes, and prefers
to leave that role to the state agencies and experts.230 This may be applied 
at the level of the judiciary but also should be incorporated through 
language into the statute. 
SLCRMA and the Administrative Code place the obligation on the 
person conducting activity within the coastal zone to seek proper 
permitting. When interpreting these laws based on legislative intent, it 
appears the legislature allocated the burden of conforming to the coastal 
use guidelines to those seeking to utilize the coastal zone to their benefit. 
However, the legislature also purposely created an administrative agency, 
and subsequently an entire administrative body of law, to implement these 
rules. The permittee has a duty to apply for a permit and ensure compliance, 
while the permitting bodies have a duty to enforce and regulate the permits. 
It is clear when a permittee violates SLCRMA by either failing to 
obtain or not abiding by permit conditions. However, the amount of 
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damages or penalties that should be assessed is not so clear, which may 
explain the local permitting bodies’ quick turn to damages in the Parish 
Coastal Zone lawsuits. By solidifying the deference doctrine, whereby the 
courts make it clear that the determination of damages by the 
administrative body is the first and foremost consideration, the issue of 
damages will be resolved. Subsection (O) of SLCRMA should require 
administrative input prior to an assessment of monies owed. The statutory 
language requiring that all damages arising from the foregoing should be 
eliminated, and language that requires an administrative determination of 
damages, prior to filing suit, should be substituted in its place.231 Finally, 
following the inclusion of that provision, the statute should read that 
judicial remedies will only be available upon a certification by the agency 
that there is a violation and that damages have and may be assessed. It 
should be the role of the courts to enforce that finding. 
CONCLUSION
The tension between development and preservation of the environment 
is palpable in Louisiana, particularly in the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits.232
SLCRMA is not clear as to the proper steps that a person harmed under the 
statute should take in order to obtain a sufficient remedy. The variety of 
administrative remedies that are available under the statute does not 
specify which should be primarily available, and because the right to bring 
an action exists for public and private persons, the courts have a wide 
breadth of interpretation.233 The consequence is that courts may dismiss suits 
with legitimate concerns at stake, and those who wish to seek enforcement are 
left without guidance. By revising SLCRMA and streamlining the language 
of the statute, issues of ambiguity will be resolved. 
Under a revised CZMA in Louisiana, there should be explicit judicial 
discretion only when a plaintiff has exhausted its remedies with the 
administrative body. By deferring to the permitting body for issues of 
damages and enforcement against the coastal user, the court places primary 
authority to the body responsible for issuing permits in the first place. 
Further, the body that has the authority under the act to bring a cause of
                                                                                                            
231. For example, the statute could read, “. . . or for damages or other relief 
arising from a determination by the Department of Natural Resources or a local 
permitting body, on appeal to the Coastal Commission, of such damages.”
232. The stated goal of the Office of Coastal Management is to balance 
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action for violations of the CUP process should be DNR. Local coastal 
zone management programs will continue to exist but should appeal to the 
Coastal Commission as an aggrieved party under the statute. Thus, the fate 
of the coast may not lay in political mongering but will be guided by 
statutory authority.
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